The reaction of bank lending to monetary policy measures in Germany by Worms, Andreas
EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK
WORKING PAPER SERIES




W W W W WORKING P ORKING P ORKING P ORKING P ORKING PAPER NO APER NO APER NO APER NO APER NO. . . . . 96  96  96  96  96
THE REA THE REA THE REA THE REA THE REACTION CTION CTION CTION CTION
OF BANK LENDING OF BANK LENDING OF BANK LENDING OF BANK LENDING OF BANK LENDING
T T T T TO MONET O MONET O MONET O MONET O MONETAR AR AR AR ARY POLICY Y POLICY Y POLICY Y POLICY Y POLICY
MEASURES IN GERMANY MEASURES IN GERMANY MEASURES IN GERMANY MEASURES IN GERMANY MEASURES IN GERMANY
BY  BY  BY  BY  BY ANDREAS W ANDREAS W ANDREAS W ANDREAS W ANDREAS WORMS ORMS ORMS ORMS ORMS






1 This paper represents the author’s personal opinions and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Deutsche Bundesbank.
W W W W WORKING P ORKING P ORKING P ORKING P ORKING PAPER NO APER NO APER NO APER NO APER NO. . . . . 96  96  96  96  96
THE REA THE REA THE REA THE REA THE REACTION CTION CTION CTION CTION
OF BANK LENDING OF BANK LENDING OF BANK LENDING OF BANK LENDING OF BANK LENDING
T T T T TO MONET O MONET O MONET O MONET O MONETAR AR AR AR ARY POLICY Y POLICY Y POLICY Y POLICY Y POLICY
MEASURES IN GERMANY MEASURES IN GERMANY MEASURES IN GERMANY MEASURES IN GERMANY MEASURES IN GERMANY1 1 1 1 1
BY  BY  BY  BY  BY ANDREAS W ANDREAS W ANDREAS W ANDREAS W ANDREAS WORMS ORMS ORMS ORMS ORMS* * * * *
December 2001 December 2001 December 2001 December 2001 December 2001© European Central Bank, 2001
Address Kaiserstrasse 29
D-60311 Frankfurt am Main
Germany
Postal address Postfach 16 03 19
D-60066 Frankfurt am Main
Germany
Telephone +49 69 1344 0
Internet http://www.ecb.int
Fax +49 69 1344 6000
Telex 411 144 ecb d
All rights reserved.
Reproduction for educational and non-commercial purposes is permitted provided that the source is acknowledged.
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Central Bank.
ISSN 1561-0810
The Eurosystem Monetary Transmission Network 
 
This issue of the ECB Working Paper Series contains research presented at a 
conference on “Monetary Policy Transmission in the Euro Area” held at the European 
Central Bank on 18 and 19 December 2001. This research was conducted within the 
Monetary Transmission Network, a group of economists affiliated with the ECB and 
the National Central Banks of the Eurosystem chaired by Ignazio Angeloni. Anil 
Kashyap (University of Chicago) acted as external consultant and Benoît Mojon as 
secretary to the Network. 
 
The papers presented at the conference examine the euro area monetary transmission 
process using different data and methodologies: structural and VAR macro-models for 
the euro area and the national economies, panel micro data analyses of the investment 
behaviour of non-financial firms and panel micro data analyses of the behaviour of 
commercial banks. 
 





II Descriptive Evidence 9
III Estimation methodology 13
IV Data 17
V Estimation results 18
V.1 Size, liquidity and capitalisation 18
V.2 Short-term interbank deposits 20
V.3 Size effects when controlling for short-term interbank deposits 22
V.4 Robustness with respect to a change in the monetary policy indicator 23
V.5 Restricting the sample to large banks 26
VI Summary and conclusion 29
Appendix 1: Definition of variables 31
Appendix 2: Tables 32
Bibliography 37
European Central Bank Working Paper Series 40ECB • Working Paper No 96 • December 2001 4


A crucial condition for the existence of a 	

 through bank loans is that
monetary policy should be able to change bank loan 
. This paper
contributes to the discussion on this issue by presenting empirical evidence from
dynamic panel estimations based on a dataset that comprises individual balance
sheet information on all German banks. It shows that the average bank reduces
its lending more sharply in reaction to a restrictive monetary policy measure
the lower its ratio of short-term interbank deposits to total assets. A dependence
on its size can only be found if explicitly controlled for this dominating effect
and/or if the very small banks are excluded. Overall, the evidence is compatible
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Based on the assumption of informational imperfections in financial markets, the
	

 assigns an active role to the 
of bank loans in monetary policy
transmission. Due to the fact that the identification of monetary policy induced loan-
supply effects is very difficult if based solely on aggregate data, the empirical
literature on this issue additionally uses microdata. The studies following this strategy
with microdata on banks typically test for a differential reaction of bank lending to
monetary policy across banks which can be attributed to a factor that is related to loan
supply but not to loan demand. In most of these studies, bank size is chosen as the
identifying variable. The underlying idea is based on the assumption that a small bank
suffers more from informational problems than a large bank. In case of a restrictive
monetary policy measure, therefore, large banks should be better able to maintain their
lending because they can more easily attract funds. Hence, based on the 
	

, small banks should reduce their lending in reaction to a restrictive monetary
policy measure by more than large banks.
The paper at hand tests this hypothesis for the German case. Compared to the existing
literature, it basically contains four innovations: (1) It uses a quarterly dataset that
covers the entire banking population in Germany on an individual basis. (2) Bank
individual seasonal patterns are explicitly taken into account. (3) Bank specific income
and risk variables are used to improve the control for differential loan demand effects.
And (4) the paper explicitly accounts for the institutional structure of the German
banking system.
The dynamic-panel estimations show that the average bank´s response to monetary
policy strongly depends on its share of short-term interbank deposits in total assets:
The higher this share, the less strongly does the average bank reduce loans in reaction
to an interest rate increase. This result is compatible with the hypothesis that banks
draw on their short-term interbank deposits in order to (at least partly) shield their
loans from restrictive monetary policy measures. The motive for such a behavior could
be to maintain close housebank-relationships to loan customers.
A direct dependence of a bank´s reaction to monetary policy on its size cannot be
found. The reason is that in Germany almost all the small banks belong to either the
cooperative sector or the savings banks´ sector, and that within these two sectors close
interbank relationships exist. Among other things, these are characterised by
comparatively large volumes of short-term interbank deposits held by small banks withECB • Working Paper No 96 • December 2001 6
the large central institutions of their system. The small banks draw on these interbank
deposits to cushion the effect of restrictive monetary policy measures on their lending.
As soon as we control for this dominant role of short-term interbank deposits, a
significant dependence of a bank´s reaction to monetary policy on its size can indeed
be found. Estimations based on a reduced sample that contains only large banks show
that short-term interbank deposits are crucial in this respect mainly for the excluded
small banks: For the large banks we find a significant size effect even without explicit
control for short-term interbank deposits.
In order to interpret these size effects as evidence for the existence of a 	


they have to be attributable to a differential reaction of loan 
 to monetary policy
across banks. This basically amounts to assuming that in reaction to a monetary policy
induced interest rate increase, the loan 	
 faced by small (and less liquid) banks
should not decrease more strongly than the loan	
 faced by large (and more
liquid) banks.
Based on this assumption, the overall results in this paper are compatible with the
existence of a 	

in Germany. This is a comparatively strong outcome if
we take into account that the regressions allow – by using the bank-individual income
and risk variables, and by explicitly considering bank-individual seasonal patterns –
for many more differences in the movements of loans across banks which are not
attributable to monetary policy induced supply changes than most of the previous




Based on the assumption of informational imperfections in financial markets, the
 	

 assigns an active role to the 
 of bank loans in monetary





 states that the central
bank is able to limit the supply of reservable deposits to banks. This may force them to




specifically concentrate on bank loans but refers more generally to the overall supply
of funds. It states that a monetary policy induced interest rate increase may worsen the
borrowers´ risk characteristics (e.g. by lowering the net worth of potential borrowers
by increasing the discount rate applied to future payments and/or by directly reducing
these payments) and – as a reaction to this – reduce the supply of funds.
The existence of a 	

has several important implications for monetary
policy: One, marginal cost and earning considerations are not the sole factors relevant
to investment and funding decisions, but additionally the availability of funds. Second,
the overall effect of monetary policy on aggregate expenditure can no longer be
completely characterised by a vector of price variables. It depends on additional
factors, like e.g. the propensity to supply funds, the average degree of substitution
between different forms of funding, and the distribution of these substitution rates
among economic agents. Moreover, since the 	

 increases the restrictive
impact of monetary policy compared to "traditional” transmission channels, the more
strongly declining income that comes with it tends c.p. to put a downward pressure on
interest rates.
1 As a result, the interest rate level alone may be an insufficient indicator
for the effects of monetary policy. Third, the  	

 implies that the
transmission process of monetary policy depends on the structure of the financial
system. This means that structural changes in the financial area may affect monetary
transmission. Moreover, this dependence implies that monetary policy may affect
economic agents asymmetrically, depending on the degree to which they suffer from
                                                
* I would like to thank Jörg Breitung, Michael Ehrmann, Dario Focarelli, Heinz Herrmann, Ulf v.
Kalckreuth, Anil Kashyap, Benoît Mojon, Daniele Terlizzese, Fabio Panetta, Philip Vermeulen and
especially Reint Gropp and Fred Ramb for their suggestions and support. This paper has benefited from
discussions at the Eurosystem Monetary Transmission Network (MTN), the Deutsche Bundesbank, the
Oesterreichische Nationalbank, and the Universities of Mannheim, Frankfurt/Main and Regensburg. Any
remaining errors and shortcomings are, of course, my own. All the computations reported in this paper
were carried out with STATA and/or DPD for Ox.
1 Bernanke, B.S./Blinder, A.S. (1988) focus on this aspect: Within an IS/LM framework they show that a
restrictive monetary policy measure does not only cause a leftward shift of the LM curve (which c.p.
causes interest rates to rise) but also – via the 	

 – a leftward shift of the IS curve (which c.p.
causes interest rates to fall), as investment declines at a given income and a given interest rate level. The
net effect of this restrictive measure on the level of interest rates is thus unclear, a priori.ECB • Working Paper No 96 • December 2001 8
the relevant financial market imperfections.
2 Given the differences in the financial
systems across the euro-area countries, this dependence may also imply that the euro-
area’s monetary policy affects some countries more strongly than others.
3
So far, the empirical evidence on the  	

 in Germany is inconclusive,
irrespective of methodology or of type of data used. While Tsatsaronis (1995), Stöß
(1996), Guender & Moersch (1997), Küppers (2000) and Favero, Giavazzi & Flabbi
(1999) come to the conclusion that a 	

 does not exist in Germany, Worms
(1998), deBondt (1999a, 1999b), Kakes & Sturm (2001) and Hülsewig, Winker &
Worms (2001) find evidence in favor of a 	

.
Some of this inconclusiveness may stem from difficulties in the identification of loan
supply versus loan demand effects of monetary policy. The existing literature has
shown that this identification is very difficult to achieve on the basis of aggregate
data.




5 Here, the identification of supply effects is based on possible differences
in monetary policy responses across economic agents that cannot be attributed to
demand factors. This strategy does not require control for shifts in (the level of) the
demand for funds – which is necessary in the case of aggregate data – but only control
for possible 
	 shifts in the demand for funds across economic agents.
Along these lines, the empirical analysis of a 	

 in Germany in this paper
uses data on individual bank balance sheets and applies panel-econometric techniques
to exploit the heterogeneity among banks. Relative to the previous literature the paper
contains four innovations: (1) It uses a quarterly dataset that covers the entire banking
population in Germany on an individual basis. (2) Bank individual seasonal patterns
are explicitly taken into account. (3) Bank specific income and risk variables are used
to improve the control for 
	 loan demand effects. And (4) the paper accounts
for the network structures that exist among small German banks.
The main findings of the paper are that the average bank´s reaction to monetary policy
does not directly depend on its size, but rather on its share of short-term interbank
deposits in total assets. Only when controlling for this dominating influence, a
                                                
2 Such asymmetric effects may also exist at the national level, e.g. with respect to regions (see Carlino,
G.A./DeFina, R.H. (1996) and Samolyk, K.A. (1994), which both relate to the US) or sectors (see Hayo,
B./Uhlenbrock, B. (1999) for Germany, Ganley, J./Salmon, C. (1996) for the UK and Dedola, L./Lippi, F.
(2000) for Germany, France, Italy, the UK and the US).
3 On this issue, see, e.g., BIS (1995), Favero, C.A./Giavazzi, F./Flabbi, L. (1999), Dornbusch, R./Favero,
C.A./Giavazzi, F. (1998), Ramaswamy, R./Sloek, T. (1998) and Guiso, L. et al (1999).
4 For an overview, see, e.g., Cecchetti, S.G. (1995). See also King, S.R. (1986), Romer, C.D./Romer, D.H.
(1990) and Ramey, V. (1993).
5 See, e.g., Kashyap, A.K./Stein, J.C. (2000, 1995) and Angeloni et al (1995).ECB • Working Paper No 96 • December 2001  9
significant size effect in line with the 	

 can be found. It is argued that this
result can be explained by the institutional structure of the German banking system.
This paper is structured as follows: The next section presents descriptive evidence on
the importance of bank loans in Germany and on the structure of the German banking
system. Section III sketches the estimation methodology and highlights the
assumptions underlying the hypothesis tests. After a description of the database
(section IV), the estimation results are presented in section V. Section VI concludes.
 			
There are a number of features of the German financial system that may have a bearing
when analysing the 	

. One is that the volume of bank loans to firms and
households has increased relative to GDP during the 1990s6, which c.p. indicates a
growing potential for a 	

 that works through bank loans. Another is that
the share of loans from domestic banks in firms´ external financing on average over
the years 1991-2000 amounted to around 36 % (securities: 15 %, equity: 21 %)
7, but
has decreased substantially over time due to an ongoing securitisation process.
8 This
trend has almost exclusively been caused by large firms: While the ratio of bank loans
to the balance sheet total has on average decreased for firms with an annual turnover
of DM 100 million and more (from 9 % in 1991 to 8 % in 1998), it has 
	 for
the other firms.
9 This indicates the growing importance of bank loans as a means of
external finance for the large majority of small and medium-sized German firms,
which are therefore of special interest for the 	

.
Table 1 presents some key numbers on the structure of the German banking system (as
of December 1998). The upper part of the table shows that credit cooperatives make
up 70 % of all the institutions, whereas the savings banks make up about 18 %
(column 1). The "other banks" – consisting primarily of the big banks (“Gross-
banken”), the head institutions of the savings banks´ and the cooperative sector, the
foreign banks and the private banks – represent only around 12 %. Despite this
comparatively small number of institutions, this latter group accounts for almost three-
quarters of all bank assets, while the many credit cooperatives together hold only 10 %
                                                
6 Starting from 50 % for firms and 27 % for households (incl. non-profit organisations) in 1991, these
ratios have reached 60 % (firms) and 44 % (households) in 2000. 
7 See Deutsche Bundesbank (2000). Please note that these numbers refer to flows.
8 From an average of 48 % between 1991 and 1993 it fell to almost 37 % between 1997 and 1999. The
mirror image of this development is the movement of the share of financing in the securities market. But
overall, this form of external finance has not been of such an importance for German non-financial
corporations (average 1991-1993: 22 %, 1997-1999: -1.6 %).
9 See Deutsche Bundesbank (2001).ECB • Working Paper No 96 • December 2001 10
(colum 3). In terms of the institutions’ importance with respect to lending to domestic








The savings banks´ and the cooperative sector could both be described as being
relatively closed systems:
11 As concernes their interbank relations, the cooperative
banks and – to a lesser degree – the savings banks transact mainly with the central
institutions of their own system (the 	
	

 in case of the savings banks and
the cooperative central banks in case of the credit cooperatives): The savings banks
hold almost three quarters of their interbank assets vis-à-vis their central institutions
(December 1998). In the case of the credit cooperatives, this share even amounts to
92 %. Accordingly, savings banks and credit cooperatives hold only a small share of
their interbank assets vis-à-vis banks outside their own system. Instead, the central
institutions hold about 54  % (	
	

) and about 42 % (cooperative central
                                                
10 These figures differ slightly from the data published in the Supplement to the Bundesbank Monthly
Report (Banking Statistics) because a small number of banks was excluded in a data screening process.
11 See Upper, C./Worms, A. (2001), esp. tables 2a and 2b, and Ehrmann, M./Worms, A. (2001).
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7RWDO￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
RI￿ZKLFK￿ savings banks 594 1,780 18 997 27 56 3.0 4.4
credit coops 2,256 1,017 10 599 16 59 0.5 1.0
“other banks” 378 7,252 72 2,093 57 29 19.2 57.7
!￿￿￿￿￿≤ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
RI￿ZKLFK￿ savings banks 3 0 0 0 0 67 0.1 0.0
credit coops 753 65 1 38 1 58 0.1 0.0
“other banks” 51 3 0 1 0 39 0.1 0.0
!￿￿￿￿￿￿≤ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
RI￿ZKLFK￿ savings banks 21 7 0 4 0 62 0.3 0.1
credit coops 734 170 2 101 3 60 0.2 0.1
“other banks” 52 13 0 5 0 38 0.2 0.1
!￿￿￿￿￿￿≤ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
RI￿ZKLFK￿ savings banks 133 99 1 57 2 58 0.7 0.2
credit coops 600 357 4 222 6 62 0.6 0.2
“other banks” 74 49 1 19 1 39 0.7 0.2
!￿￿￿￿￿￿≤ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
RI￿ZKLFK￿ savings banks 437 1,675 17 936 25 56 3.8 4.9
credit coops 169 424 4 238 6 56 2.5 2.9
“other banks” 201 7,188 72 2,068 56 29 35.8 75.4
!￿￿￿￿￿≤ ￿￿￿
￿RQO\￿‡RWKHU￿EDQNV·￿
￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ECB • Working Paper No 96 • December 2001  11
banks) vis-à-vis domestic banks that do not belong to their own system. Both systems
therefore incorporate some sort of “internal interbank market”, with the central
institutions providing the links of their respective system to the “other banks”.
Table 1 additionally contains information on the size structure of the German banking
system. The grouping is based on percentiles of the distribution of total assets across
all banks so that four (in terms of the number of banks) equally large size groups
result. 93 % of the credit cooperatives belong to the three groups of smaller banks and
the fourth group mainly consists of savings banks (54 %) and “other banks” (25 %).
This group of the largest 807 banks comprises 92 % of the total assets of all banks
(column 3), with an average bank size of about DM 11.5 billion (column 7).
Additionally, the quantile from 99 % to 100 % is indicated separately (bottom row).
These 32 largest banks – among which there are no credit cooperatives or savings
banks – hold a sum of total assets that comprises more than half of the total assets of
all banks (column 3). With an average size of more than DM 170 billion, they are
more than 50 times bigger than the average over all banks (column 7).
It is interesting, however, that this group´s share of lending in total assets, at an
average of 27 % is much lowerthan that of the smaller banks, even much lower than
that of the 25 %-quantile of the largest banks to which it likewise belongs (column 6).
More generally, the lending business to domestic private non-banks seems to be of
much more importance for the small and medium-sized banks, i.e. for credit
cooperatives and for savings banks, than for the large banks: On average, almost 60 %
of the total assets of the three groups of smaller banks are loans to domestic private
non-banks, while this share amounts to only 35 % in the case of the large banks. This
high share in case of the smaller banks is the result of a steady increase during the
1990s. In the same period this ratio has even decreased for the large banks.
12
Therefore, parallel to the growing importance of bank loans as a means of external
finance for small and medium-sized private non-banks during the 1990s, loans became
more important as an asset mainly for the small and medium-sized banks. This is
compatible with the notion that loans to households and small and medium-sized firms
are mainly supplied by the small and medium-sized banks. Unfortunately, the available
data do not contain information on individual borrowers so that it is not possible to
exactly determine the variation of loan customer size across banks. However, based on
the breakdown of loans into borrower groups, it appears that savings banks and credit
                                                
12 See Worms, A. (2001), which is an extended version of the paper at hand. It also contains more
regression results and a more detailled discussion of specific methodological issues.ECB • Working Paper No 96 • December 2001 12
cooperatives give a greater share of their assets in the form of loans to those borrowers
that may be assumed to be small or medium-sized on average.
13
This is consistent with the hypothesis that small and medium-sized firms and
households are more likely to obtain loans from savings banks and credit cooperatives
than from “other banks” (although this hypothesis cannot be strictly tested with the
available data).
14 For that reason, they are of particular interest with regard to the
	

. The large volumes of loans of the large banks are probably mainly due
to the fact that they give major individual loans to large enterprises which, however,
have a number of other financing instruments available to them as a substitute for bank








Given the problems of identifying monetary policy induced loan 
 shifts when
using macrodata, the empirical analysis in this paper uses quarterly individual bank
data. According to the 	

 theory, the informational imperfections in the
financial markets that create bank loan supply effects of monetary policy also result in
differential loan supply responses across banks. The underlying assumption is that it is
the more difficult for a bank to offset the effects of a restrictive monetary policy
measure, the higher the degree to which it suffers from asymmetric information vis-à-
vis its suppliers of funds. In the literature, bank size is the most commonly used
indicator for the ability of banks to generate outside financing: The idea is that small
banks have more difficulties in raising funds because they face higher information
costs and/or a higher external finance premium than large banks. They are therefore
less able to offset contractionary monetary policy measures and have to reduce their
loan supply more strongly than large banks.
15
Another indicator that has been used in the literature is the capitalisation of a bank.
16
The idea is based on the argument that a higher capitalisation makes a bank less prone
to moral hazard and asymmetric information problems vis-à-vis its suppliers of funds.
Therefore, the external finance premium of a well capitalised bank should be smaller
than that of a poorly capitalised one. This implies that less capitalised banks should be
                                                
13 At the end of 1998 more than 42 % of the loans of the saving banks and more than 47 % of the loans of
the credit cooperatives were granted to individuals, compared to less than 14 % (savings banks) and 11 %
(credit cooperatives) to domestic enterprises. By contrast, the “other banks” on average hold less than
14 % of their loans vis-à-vis domestic individuals and 15 % vis-à-vis domestic enterprises.
14 For the US, see Hubbard, G.D. (2000).
15 See, e.g., Kashyap, A.K./Stein, J.C. (2000, 1995).
16 See, e.g., Kishan, R.P./Opiela, T.P. (2000) and Peek, J./Rosengren, E.S. (1995).ECB • Working Paper No 96 • December 2001  13
forced to restrict their lending more strongly in reaction to a restrictive monetary
policy measure than well capitalised banks.
But, there are fundamental problems with using capitalisation to identify possible loan
supply effects of monetary policy. One is that banks may hold higher amounts of
capital because they are more risky. Therefore, a bank´s capitalisation (also) mirrors
the riskiness of its loan portfolio. As information on risk adjusted capital requirements
is not publicly available, the interpretation of results based on capital as it appears on
the banks´ balance sheets remains unclear. Moreover, the period under consideration is
characterised by a declinig trend in the short-term interest rate which amounts to a
more or less steady easing in the stance of monetary policy. In such a period, a well
capitalised bank can more easily 	
 its loans compared to one that is restricted by
capital requirements. This should show up in a positive dependence of a bank´s re-
action to monetary policy on its capitalisation – which is also the result predicted by
the 	

theory. But, this argument cannot directly be applied to the case of a




Therefore, compared to capitalisation, a bank´s size is the preferred indicator for the
degree to which it suffers from informational problems, because size is less biased by
other factors. Accordingly, the test for the existence of a 	

 should be
mainly based on bank size and not on capitalisation. Nevertheless, in the following the
regression results based on capitalisation are also presented, but without further
interpretation. This is done mainly for reasons of comparability to studies that have
used such an indicator.
A bank´s liquidity may also play a role in determining its reaction to monetary policy,
because a bank should be the more able to shield its loan portfolio from a restrictive
monetary policy measure the more liquid assets it can draw on.
17 But, liquidity may be
endogenous: Those banks that suffer most from informational imperfections will
probably also hold large stocks of liquid assets. In addition, we cannot exclude the
possibility that more liquid banks are more risk averse and, hence, also have tighter
lending standards. If this is the case and there are differences in loan demand between
risky and less risky firms in response to a monetary policy shock, liquidity does also
not serve well as the discriminating variable to identify supply effects.
The general strategy of the subsequent empirical analysis is to test for a differential
response of bank loans to monetary policy across banks, depending on the banks´ size,
                                                
17 See Kashyap, A.K./Stein, J.C. (2000).ECB • Working Paper No 96 • December 2001 14
but also on capitalisation and liquidity. This test will be performed by applying
dynamic panel-estimation techniques to the following single equation which can be
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Q￿W is the stock of loans to domestic private non-banks of bank 
 in quarter  ( ∆
indicates first differences), W is the indicator of monetary policy and ε Q￿W is the error
term. %Q￿W is a matrix of bank specific variables that serve to capture determinants of
loan movements that are not caused by monetary policy induced shifts in loan supply.
(1) allows for a bank specific fixed-effect, i.e. a bank specific constant α Q (which
amounts to a bank specific trend in logQ￿W).
A bank´s loan reaction to monetary policy is assumed to depend linearly on the bank
characterising variable 	 (which could be size, liquidity or capitalisation, for the
definition of these variables, see appendix 1) and is therefore allowed to vary across
banks and time. This is captured by the “interaction terms”  ( ) N W N W Q  	 − − ⋅ ∆ , . 	
is also included in a non-interacted fashion in order to prevent that possible direct
effects of this variable on ∆ logQ￿W are captured by the coefficients.
The long-run coefficient of the interaction term can be used to test for the presence of
loan supply effects of monetary policy if all other variables of the estimation equation
sufficiently capture (differential) loan movements caused by loan demand or caused by
loan supply factors other than monetary policy. If in this case the long-run coefficient
of the interaction term is not statistically different from zero, then there is no
differential loan reaction to monetary policy across banks, i.e. then this methodology is
unable to identify loan supply effects of monetary policy.
Since the hypothesis test consists of looking for 
 in the loan reaction of
banks, it is useful to completely eliminate the overall effect of pure time variables (e.g.
the business cycle, the level of interest rates, inflation...) on ∆ logQ￿W. This is most
effectively done by including a complete set of time dummies W. While this comes
with the drawback that the (average) level effect of monetary policy is also captured
by these dummies, i.e. that ∆ W cannot be included as such, it guarantees a perfect
control for the time effect on the endogenous variable and therefore enhances the
                                                
18 For more details, see Ehrmann, M. et al (2001) and the discussion in Farinha, L./Marques, R.C. (2001).ECB • Working Paper No 96 • December 2001  15
power of the hypothesis test.
19 Moreover, (1) can then be interpreted as the reduced
form of a broad variety of models that differ only in respect to the number and the
choice of included time series variables, because the use of W implicitly captures the
effect of all of them.
%Q￿W consists of (the logarithm of) a bank-individual income variable, Q￿W, and (the
logarithm of) a bank-individual default-risk measure, Q￿W. The income of bank 
´s
loan customers Q is approximated by an average of sectoral real incomes (of nine
production sectors and the private households), with sector ´s real income 
M being
weighted by this sector ´s share in bank 
´s loan portfolio (for detailed definitions of
























, .  (2)
The bank's default-risk is approximated by Q￿W, which is a sectoral average of the
number of insolvencies. Sector ´s insolvencies 





























, .  (3)
A priori, it is unclear how loan growth depends on a change in Q￿W and a change in
Q￿W in the short-run: If the “cash-flow effect” dominates in the short-run, then the
coefficients of the lower-order lags of Q￿W should be negative: In this case, a reduced
income worsens the ability to finance expenditures internally and thereby leads to an
increase in the 	
 for external finance, given expenditures are relatively fixed
(which is realistic in the short-run).
21 A similar argument could apply to the risk
                                                
19 While the use of time series instead of a set of time dummies weakens the power of the test for a
differential reaction to monetary policy across banks, it allows for assessing the (average) level effect of
monetary policy. Estimations of equation (1) with time series are presented in Worms, A. (2001). The
long-run coefficient of ∆  in these regressions is always significantly negative, as one would expect (see
also Ehrmann et al (2001) for a comparable set of results).
20 Within the 		
	

a monetary-policy induced interest rate increase may in principle
reduce loan supply by (a) (endogenously) increasing the average probability of default and (b) by lowering
the amount payed to the bank in case of a (exogenous) default, where typically net worth serves as an
indicator for this amount. Including Q￿W as an explanatory variable may capture a possible differential
reaction of banks´ loan supply to monetary policy that is caused by (a), which would otherwise be
captured by the interaction term in equation (1). Therefore, the inclusion of Q￿W may lead to an
underestimation of possible loan-supply effects of monetary policy by the interaction term. But, in
accordance with most of the relevant literature, I assume that the effect of monetary policy on Q￿W is only
of minor relevance (compared to the influence of exogenous changes in default risk on loans).
21 The “cash-flow effect” is the most convincing explanation for the often found positive correlation
between the interest-rate level and the growth rate of loans. See, e.g., Müller, M./Worms, A. (1995) for
descriptive evidence. Impulse responses with such an intial positive reaction of loans to a restrictive
monetary policy shock for Germany are presented in Worms, A. (1998), particularly pp. 268-291. For the
US, see Bernanke, B.S./Gertler, M. (1995), particularly p. 44.ECB • Working Paper No 96 • December 2001 16
variable: If the default risk of the loan portfolio increases, then the bank may increase
loans in order to enable firms to solve their liquidity problems and in order to meet a
possibly increasing demand for loans. In this case, the coefficients of the lower-order
lags of Q￿W should be positive. However, despite this ambiguity with respect to the
coefficient signs of Q￿W and Q￿W in the short-run, the signs of their long-run
coefficients are unambigous and can therefore be used as a device to judge the
adequacy of the estimations: The long-run coefficient of the income variable should be
positive and that of the default-risk variable should be negative.
The bank specific fixed-effect α Q in (1) takes the form of a bank individual constant. In
order to be able to estimate an equation with  such varying constants,α Q is removed
from the estimation equation by taking first differences of (1).
22 But, due to the
dynamic nature of the model, this creates a correlation between the lagged-endogenous
variables and the error term, leading to biased and inconsistent OLS-estimates.
23
Therefore, the GMM-method proposed by Arellano & Bond (1991) will be applied
subsequently.
24 Here, the lagged levels of the regression variables are used as
instrumental variables.
Finally, in order to meet possible endogeneity problems, the right-hand variables enter
the regression with at least one lag (see equation (1)).
25 As the maximum lag length 
of the variables that enter the regression four lags proved to be sufficient. In order not
to have different values for the bank characteristic variable 	Q￿W at a given quarter 
in equation (1), only one lag of 	 instead of four enters the regression at .
Therefore, at a given quarter , the four interaction terms consist of 	Q￿W￿￿ and the
respective lags of ∆ W: (	Q￿W￿￿⋅∆ W￿￿), (	Q￿W￿￿⋅∆ W￿￿), (	Q￿W￿￿⋅∆ W￿￿) and
(	Q￿W￿￿⋅ ∆ W￿￿). Accordingly, only 	Q￿W￿￿ is included in a non-interacted fashion.
                                                
22 Another way of eliminating the fixed-effect is to substract individual means (within-transformation).
Usually, taking first difference is preferred in the literature, because the instrumentalisation with lagged
variables in case of a within transformation needs a much stronger exogeneity assumption than in case of
first differences: If the model is written in first differences, all past values (with more than two lags) of any
weakly exogenous variable are valid instruments. In particular, (twice) lagged levels and differences are
valid in this context as long as the original disturbance is not serially correlated. If the model is written in
deviations from individual means, the new disturbance comprises all past, present and future values of the
original disturbances. Then, for a variable to be a valid instrument, it has to be strongly exogenous, which
is a stronger assumption that is much less likely to be satisfied.
23 See Nickell, S. (1981).
24 See Arellano, M./Bond, S. (1991) and Doornik, J.A./Arellano, M./Bond, S. (1999).
25 Due to the fact that the individual variables are based on balance sheet data, an endogeneity problem
emerges: If bank loans and another position are strongly correlated, it is not clear a priori which position
drives the other. The following regressions cope with this problem in two ways: Firstly, based on the
Arellano/Bond procedure, all right-hand variables are instrumentalised by their lagged levels (GMM-
instruments). Secondly, the right-hand variables enter the regression with at least one lag. The
endogeneity/exogeneity-issue then hinges on a timing assumption which leads to a correct identification of
the driving forces behind loan growth if  “Granger-causality” is the adequate causality concept.ECB • Working Paper No 96 • December 2001  17
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The monthly balance sheet data available for this analysis spans over the period 1992-
1998
26 and comprises all German banks (around 4400).
27 As quarterly macrodata and
information from the quarterly borrowers statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank have
also been used (e.g. for calculating the income and risk indices), quarterly values were
taken by using end of quarter values. Accordingly, there are 28 observations for a bank
that has been in the database over the entire period under analysis, and almost 100,000
observations are available.
The balance sheet items of banks that have merged were summed for the time before
the merger took place.
28 Applying this procedure to the data leads to a loss of about
10,000 observations, so that 3,296 banks and about 90,000 observations remain in the
dataset. After removing those banks that do not have observations in all necessary
balance sheet positions, 3,207 banks remain in the sample.
A realisation of a variable is defined as an outlier if it is smaller or larger than
prespecified percentiles of the distribution of this variable across all banks and all
quarters. The choice of the critical values is made by visual inspection:
29 In the case of
∆ log the 2
nd and the 98
th percentile prove to be adequate, in the case of the 	
variables the 1
st and the 99
th percentile are sufficient.
30 Every bank that has at least one
outlier in either ∆ logor the respective 	-variable is removed from the sample.
The end result is a reduction of the sample by around 13,000 observations (around 450
banks) so that about 2,800 banks and 75,000 observations remain in the sample.
31
                                                
26 There has been a change in data definitions created by the harmonisation procedure in the uprun to
EMU. The data used in this study therefore ends in 1998 because the additionally available quarters from
1999 to mid-2001 would be too few to appropriately handle this statistical break.
27 The analysis does not use information on bank individual interest rates, because such information is
available only for a sample that comprises about 10 % of all German banks. Moreover, the information
contained in this data is insufficient to analyse the question at hand, because it only reports the medians of
the distributions of a banks´ interest rates for given categories of loans and deposits.
28 For a discussion of this procedure and its implications for the individual effect, see Worms, A. (2001).
In that paper, the subsequent basic regressions have also been carried out based on two other merger
treatments. Due to the fact that the most important results are robust against this variation, only those
based on this “backward aggregation”-procedure are presented here.
29 Given that outliers can very strongly bias the results in panel regressions, the danger of eliminating “too
few” observations should be weighted much higher than the danger to eliminate “too many” observations,
especially when taking into account the large dataset. Therefore, when in doubt, the thresholds are chosen
so that all possible “dubious” observations are removed.
30 In the case of bank size, the outlier procedure is based on ∆  in order not to remove the large banks. In
the cases of capitalisation and liquidity it is directly based on 	 and , respectively.
31 The number of observations and banks varies across regressions because the outlier procedure is
regression specific in the sense that it is applied only to ∆ log and the respective 	-variable(s): If, e.g.,
size is used, then those banks that have outliers in the liquidity or in the capitalisation variable, but not in
size, remain in the sample. This creates samples that are adequate with respect to a specific issue (e.g. “	
 ”), i.e. that are independent of possible other issues (e.g. “	
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There are several indications for bank-individual seasonal patterns in the data that – if
not properly accounted for – worsen the quality of possible instruments and lead to a
low degree of robustness of the results with respect to changes in the specification.
32
Moreover, different seasonal patterns create differences in the loan movements across
banks that may falsely be attributed to a differential reaction to monetary policy if not
explicitly taken into account. Therefore, in order to cope with this seasonality
problem, all bank specific variables (Q￿W, the 	Q￿W-variables,  Q￿W and Q￿W) are






In the basic specification, the 3-month interest rate is used as the indicator of monetary
policy. Table 2a presents results for the three bank characteristics: In regression 1 size
(), in regression 2 liquidity () and in regression 3 capitalisation (	).
34The long-
run coefficients of the respective interaction-term, of the income variable and of the
risk variable are reported (the short-run coefficients are reported in appendix 2).
The statistical tests indicate an adequate instrumentalisation in all cases.
35 Moreover,
the long-run coefficients of the control variables do in no case show a significantly
unexpected sign: Only in regression 2 (liquidity) is the coefficient of the income
variable insignificant.
The long-run coefficient of the size-interaction is negative and insignificant
(regression 1). This indicates that a bank´s reaction to monetary policy does not
                                                
32 Preceding regressions based on annual growth rates proved to be better in terms of instrumentalisation
and robustness than regressions based on 1
st differences. This is also the case when regressions were based
on annualised data. Moreover, bank-individual regressions show a broad variety of seasonal patterns.
33 For more details, see Worms, A. (2001).
34 All bank characterising variables are demeaned in order to obtain 	-variables with a sum across all
included oberservations of zero. This guarantees that the ´s in (1) are not influenced by the level effect of
∆  on ∆ logQ￿W. In case of the size variable, the time varying mean across all banks is substracted from
the log of total assets of bank 
. This removes the overall trend in the log of total assets from siz,
indicating that the size of a bank relative to the average size across all banks 		
!is the
relevant measure. This leads to a siz-variable that is on average zero in period . In the case of the
capitalisation and the liquidity variable, the overall mean (across time and banks) is substracted. This
creates bank characterising variables that are zero across all observations but not necessarily at every
single period. This allows the overall degree of liquidity and capitalisation to vary across periods.
35 Ideally, the instruments should be highly correlated with the variables they serve as instruments for,
while they should be uncorrelated with the disturbances. This can be assesed on the basis of auto-
correlation (AR)-tests and the Sargan-Test. In order to find the adequate lag length for the instrumental
variables, every regression has been carried out several times, starting with lags 2 to 4 of the levels of the
regression variables. Typically, a poorer instrumentalisation (only lag 2 or lags 2 and 3) led to an
insignificant sum of coefficients of the lagged-endogenous variables, which implies very large standard
errors of the long-run coefficients of the other right-hand variables. In most cases, the AR-tests and the
Sargan-test pointed to an adequate instrumentalisation for a maximum lag of 6.ECB • Working Paper No 96 • December 2001  19
directly depend on its size – which is contrary to what the 	

 theory would
predict and also contrasts the results of the existing empirical literature on the US and
on many other countries.
36 In the case of liquidity (regression 2) the long-run coeffi-
cient of the interaction-term is significantly positive. This indicates that the long-run
effect of an increase in the interest rate on bank lending is the smaller, the more liquid
a bank is: The effect of a one percentage point increase in W on ∆ logQ￿W decreases on
average by 0.035 percentage points when the liquidity ratio of a bank is increased by
one percentage point. This finding implies that, in periods of a restrictive monetary
policy, a borrower from a less liquid bank on average tends to suffer from a sharper
decline in lending than does a customer of a more liquid bank. According to regression
3, a comparable result also holds in the case of capitalisation: The better capitalised a










Coefficients and standard errors of the bank individual income and risk variable multiplied by 100.
*, **, *** = significance at the 10%-, 5%,- 1%-level (standard errors in parenthesis).
See table A1 in appendix 2 for the short-run coefficients. Based on results from 2nd estimation step.
37
It is interesting to have a look at the short-run coefficients (see table A1 in appendix
2), because they can give an indication for possible loan 	
 effects. The four
coefficients of the income variable in regressions 1-5 are insignificant for lags 1 and 2,
but significantly positive either for lag 3 or 4. This is compatible with the “cash-flow
effect” of loan 	
: Given a certain rigidity in expenditures, a reduction in income
                                                
36 See table 2 in Worms, A. (2001) and, e.g., deBondt, G.J. (1999).
37 Inferences on the coefficients should normally be based on the first step results of the GMM-estimation,
but due to computational problems (estimations were carried out with DPD for Ox), the second-step
results were used instead. This does not alter the results significantly because the differences between the
first and the second step estimates are negligible due to the large number of banks in the sample.
-0.0448 * 0.0353 *** 0.1360 ***
(0.0251) (0.0056) (0.0406)
1.1928 *** 0.7556 0.9602 **
(0.4884) (0.4933) (0.4916)
-0.6914 *** -0.7331 *** -0.5662 ***
(0.1186) (0.1222) (0.1189)
AR1 (p-val,1st step) 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
AR2 (p-val,1st step) 0.405 0.557 0.348
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(which could be exogenous or caused by the interest rate and/or the exchange rate
channel of monetary policy) causes loan 	
 to increase in the first two quarters at
least in some cases. If some loan customers also decrease their loan 	
 and/or
some banks decrease loan 
 in reaction to the decreasing income, then such a
mixture of positive and negative effects could explain the insignificance of the income
coefficients in the early quarters. Only after some time, the cash-flow effect looses its
strenth because expenditures are adapted. As a result, overall loan 	
 decreases
and the “income-expectation effect” starts to dominate the movements of the loan
aggregate: A higher income may imply or cause the expectation of rising income in the
future, thereby increasing investment and loan 	
. Due to the decreasing
importance of this short-run “perverse” 	
reaction coming from the cash-flow
effect, the income coefficient becomes significantly positive not before lag 3 or 4.
Obviously, a similar argument does not apply to the risk variable: Here, the coefficient
signs do not change significantly from positive to negative when increasing the lag.
Therefore, the hypothesis that a growing default risk of the existing loan portfolio may

	loan growth in the very short run due to an increasing 	
 for loans
cannot be confirmed by these regressions.
Hence, the results indicate that the impact of monetary policy on bank loans differs
only with respect to two of the bank characteristics that have been considered:
Liquidity and capitalisation. Possible bank loan supply effects of monetary policy





The result that size is not important for a bank´s reaction to monetary policy can be
explained by the structure of the German banking system, which differs considerably
from that of other countries, e.g. the US. As shown in table 1, the small banks mainly
consist of credit cooperatives and – to a lesser extent – of savings banks. Besides these
comparatively small institutions, the savings banks´ sector as well as the cooperative
sector also contain large superordinate central institutions.
38 As has been pointed out in
section II, these central institutions maintain close relationships with the lower level
institutions of their own system and with the “other” domestic banks, while savings
banks and credit cooperatives have relationships almost exclusively with the central
institutions of their own network. Given these close interbank links within the two
systems, it is possible that in case of a restrictive monetary policy measure funds are
channelled from the central institutions to their affiliated small institutions, thus
                                                
38 The central institutions of both sectors belong to the 5 % largest banks (Deutsche Bundesbank (2001)).ECB • Working Paper No 96 • December 2001  21
counteracting potential funding problems otherwise faced by these small banks.
Indeed, in a VECM-framework, Ehrmann & Worms (2001) show that after a restric-
tive monetary policy shock, funds flow from the central institutions to the smaller
banks of their respective system.
39 These flows are mainly reductions of short-term
deposits held by the small banks with the large banks. This observation is compatible
with the hypothesis that small banks reduce their short-term interbank deposits in











Coefficients and standard errors of the bank individual income and risk variable multiplied by 100.
*, **, *** = significance at the 10%-, 5%,- 1%-level (standard errors in parenthesis).
See table A1 in appendix 2 for the short-run coefficients. Based on results from 2nd estimation step.
This explains two of the regression results presented in table 2a: Firstly, the interbank
flows from large to small banks can be the reason for the result that bank size is not a
significant determinant of a bank´s reaction to monetary policy, although it is not clear
if the monetary policy induced interbank flows described in Ehrmann & Worms
(2001) are sufficient to completely offset possible bank-size related effects. Secondly,
given that short-term interbank deposits are included in the liquidity variable used in
regression 2 (see appendix 1 for the exact definition), it could well be that the signifi-
cant relationship between the banks´ liquidity and their reaction to monetary policy is
mainly driven by short-term interbank deposits. In order to test this hypothesis, the
liquidity variable is splitted into two parts: The percentage share of short-term
interbank deposits in total assets, , and the precentage share of the remaining “other
liquid assets” – which mainly consist of securities –  to total assets, !.
                                                
39 See Ehrmann, M./Worms, A. (2001).
0.0976 *** -0.0172 ***
(0.0116) (0.0064)
1.1292 ** 1.2491 **
(0.5072) (0.5547)
-0.9123 *** -0.8220 ***
(0.1301) (0.1423)
AR1 (p-val,1st step) 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
AR2 (p-val,1st step) 0.262 0.677
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Repeating the regressions with these two components of liquidity as the 	-
variables yields the results presented in table 2b. While the long-run coefficient of the
interaction term is significantly positive in case of short-term interbank deposits
(regression 4), it is significantly negative in case of the “other liquid assets”
(regression 5). Despite the fact that the latter result is difficult to explain, it
nevertheless strongly indicates that the significantly positive coefficient of the
liquidity-interaction term presented in table 2a (regression 2) is mainly driven by the
movements of short-term interbank deposits" Obviously, the average bank does not
draw on the assets contained in the liquidity variable other than short-term interbank









Given the strong evidence in favor of the interbank-variable , the weak result
especially for bank size leads to the following question: Is there a size effect if we
control for the influence of short-term interbank deposits? In order to test for this, the
estimation equation is enhanced to include both interaction-terms, size and short-term
interbank deposits. Compared to equation (1) this extended equation does not only
contain  and the “single” interaction ∆ #, but additionally  and ∆ #.
Moreover, the respective “double interaction terms” # and ∆ ## are also
ncluded in order to allow for possible second-order effects of  and .
Table 3 presents the results (regression d1). The coefficients of the control variables
∆  and ∆  are significant and show the expected signs. The coefficient of the 
interaction is significantly positive like in all previous regressions. This again shows
the robustness of this effect. Interestingly, the size-interaction term is now also
significantly positive (instead of insignificant in table 2a). Therefore, when controlling
for the effect of short-term interbank deposits on a bank´s reaction to monetary policy,
a positive size dependence of this reaction cannot be rejected: A bank reacts the less
restrictive to a restrictive monetary policy measure the higher its short-term interbank
deposits 	
 the larger it is, which is in line with the 	

 theory. But, given
that such a positive coefficient of the size-interaction term does not show up in the
single-interaction regression presented in table 2a, it can be interpreted as being
dominated by the influence exerted by . Hence, the regressions presented in table 2a
suffer from an omitted variable bias.
                                                
40 A possible test for the dominance of the  over the -effect is to include both 	variables in one
regression. This results in a significantly positive interaction term for short-term interbank deposits and an
insignificant coefficient for the liquidity interaction. This indicates that the influence of liquidity is already
captured by the short-term interbank deposits, i.e. that for the average bank,  does not contain any













Coefficients and standard errors of the bank individual income and risk variable multiplied by 100.
*, **, *** = significance at the 10%-, 5%,- 1%-level (standard errors in parenthesis).
See table A2 in appendix 2 for the short-run coefficients. Based on results from 2nd estimation step.
Another interesting result is the insignificant coefficient of the double interaction with
∆ . It means that the strength of the effect of short-term interbank deposits on the
reaction of a bank to monetary policy does not depend on its size and vice-versa.
Stated differently: Assume a certain combination of  and  which implies a
specific reaction to a change in $i.e. a specific long-run reaction coefficient to
monetary policy. Given an increase in size, this long-run coefficient remains constant
if short-term interbank deposits decrease accordingly. The zero long-run coefficient of
the double interaction implies that this substitution relation between  and  is
constant, i.e. independent of (the level of)  and .
Table 3 also contains the results of using  and 	 simultaneously(regression d2).
Here again, the interaction term with short-term interbank deposits is positive.
Additionally, the coefficient of the 	-interaction term is significantly positive (as in
table 2a): C.p., loans of well capitalised banks decline less strongly than loans of less








Besides the supply-demand identification problem, the empirical analysis of the 
	

– like the empirical literature on monetary transmission in general – has a
	%"
	&"
0.1011 *** 0.1221 ***
(0.0258) (0.0464)
0.0988 *** 0.0775 ***
(0.0093) (0.0112)




-0.7778 *** -0.3950 ***
(0.1028) (0.1604)
AR1 (p-val,1st step) 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
AR2 (p-val,1st step) 0.263 0.559
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further key problem of identification: That between endogenous and exogenous
monetary policy measures. It stems from the fact that a central bank acts with the
short-term interest rate W to observed and/or expected changes of other relevant
variables.  ∆ W thus contains an endogenous component that causes a measurement
problem with regard to the effects of monetary policy. If it is possible to extract the
!
!
 component from ∆ W, then – according to the respective literature
41 – it may
be used to measure the effects of monetary policy measures more accurately.
Therefore, in order to check robustness of the results presented in table 3 with regard
to the choice of , the estimations are carried out anew using a VAR-shock asthe
monetary policy indicator. The VAR contains a world commodity price index, US real
GDP, US short-term interest rate and a linear trend as exogenous variables. Endogenous
variables are German real GDP, consumer prices, the 3-month interest rate and the real
effective exchange rate.
42 The VAR allows for a contemporaneous response of the
interest rate to the real effective exchange rate and is therefore much more realistic
than many of the VARs for Germany existing in the literature. Moreover, it is able to
generate impulse response functions that do not entail a “price puzzle”.
43
The residuals of the short-term interest rate equation are interpreted as the exogenous
interest rate component:  9$5
W
9$5
W W W  
    ) ( ˆ ˆ = − = .
44 The results confirm the
dominance of short-term interbank deposits – the coefficients of the -interaction
term are significantly positive in both regressions (table 4).
45 But, contrasting
regression d1, there is no significant influence of size (and also the coefficient of the
	-interaction becomes insignificant).
Therefore, the significantly positive size effect found when controlling for short-term
interbank deposits (table 3) is not robust against this change in the monetary policy
indicator. But, when interpreting these results it should be borne in mind that the use
of the VAR-shock as the monetary policy indicator hinges on a number of important
                                                
41 See, e.g., Sims, C. (1996), Uhlig, H. (1998) and Bernanke, B.S./Mihov, I. (1995). The Bundesbank’s
policy is analysed in Bernanke, B.S./Mihov, I. (1996) and Clarida, R./Gertler, M. (1997).
42 The VAR was estimated by F. Smets and R. Wouters whom I would like to thank for supplying me with
their data and results.
 See Smets, F./Wouters, R. (1999) for more information on the regression. The
sample period is 1980 - 1998.
43 See, e.g., Worms, A. (1998), esp. pp. 278-291. In order to solve the identification problem, the reaction
coefficient on the exchange rate is estimated using the Japanese interest rate and US-Dollar/Yen exchange
rate as instruments. See Smets, F./Wouters, R. (1999).
44 The VAR-shocks are only available up to the second quarter of 1998, so that the number of
observations used in the regressions presented in table 3 is smaller than the number of observations used
in those presented in table 4.
45 The coefficient of the -interaction term in a single interaction regression is also significantly positive
when the VAR-shock is used. See Worms, A. (2001).ECB • Working Paper No 96 • December 2001  25
assumptions.
46 One of the most critical is probably that the estimated exogenous
changes in the interest rate should have the same effects as the endogenous changes.
Only then can the estimated effect be used to describe the overall effects of monetary
policy. 
 Given this problem and given that the interest rate shocks may change with a
change in the specification of the VAR, the lack of robustness with respect to the













Coefficients and standard errors of the bank individual income and risk variable multiplied by 100.
*, **, *** = significance at the 10%-, 5%,- 1%-level (standard errors in parenthesis).
See table A3 in appendix 2 for the short-run coefficients. Based on results from 2nd estimation step.
In order to determine the “adequate” method of measuring monetary policy, these
drawbacks have to be weighted against the endogeneity/exogeneity-problem that
comes with using the short-term interest rate as such. Given that the regressions are
based on bank individual information (which probably does not lead to monetary
policy induced interest rate changes) and that ∆  does not enter the regressions
contemporaneously, this endogeneity/exogeneity-issue is probably less severe. Hence,
in the following all further results are presented using our preferred measure of
monetary policy, the 3-month interest rate.
47
                                                
46 For a critique of VAR approaches to measure monetary policy effects, see, e.g., McCallum, B.T. (1999),
Faust, J. (1998) and Rudebusch, G.D. (1996).
47 The literature discusses several methods of determining the exogenous component in the interest rate,
like using financial market data to extract expected changes of the short-term interest rate, the “narrative
approach”, the use of a specific reaction function of the central bank aso. All of these alternatives have













AR1 (p-val,1st step) 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
AR2 (p-val,1st step) 0.622 0.462

































Table 5 presents information on four groups of banks. They have been formed by first
ranking the banks according to their individual loan-market share and subsequently
sorting them into four groups that each hold (around) 25 % of the loan market (see
also table 1). The group of the largest banks that together holds around 25 % loan
market share consists of only 4 banks, whereas the group of the smallest banks
consists of 2188 banks.
(based on the sample used for estimating regression 4, i.e. corrected for outliers in ∆ log and )
group: 	 	 	 	
number of banks 4 22 195 2188
RI￿ZKLFK￿ VDYLQJV￿EDQNV ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿
FUHGLW￿FRRSHUDWLYHV ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
RWKHU￿EDQNV ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
loan market share in % 26.3 24.1 24.6 25.0
average of  in % 14.9 10.9 7.6 10.0
average of  in % 30.1 25.4 31.4 33.5
average of 	 in % 5.5 3.2 4.0 4.4
average of  (log of total assets) 19.4 17.6 15.2 12.4
Given that all banks enter the regression with the same weight, i.e. independent of
their size, it could well be that the previous results are solely driven by the many very
small banks in the sample. In order to test if the results obtained so far hold even if the
least important banks in terms of the loan-market share are excluded, the regressions
presented in tables 2a and 2b are repeated with only those larger banks that together
constitute 75 % of the loan market, i.e. the “very small” banks are excluded and the
estimations are carried out anew with the remaining banks, which are around 220-270.
Table 6 presents the results: Like in all preceding regressions the long-run coefficients
of the risk variable are significantly negative in all cases. Those of the income variable
are significantly positive in all cases, except in the regression with the -interaction.
Interestingly, all the coefficients of the interaction terms are significantly positive
now: This shows that the results for liquidity, capitalisation and short-term interbank
deposits presented in tables 2a and 2b hold qualitatively even if the sample is reduced
to contain the larger banks only. Moreover, even those interaction terms that were
either insignificant (size) or had an implausible sign (“other liquid assets”) when using
the whole sample, now show significantly the expected signs.
48
                                                
48 The qualitative results presented in table 6 are robust against using the VAR-shock in all cases but in





















Coefficients and standard errors of the bank individual income and risk variable multiplied by 100.
*, **, *** = significance at the 10%-, 5%,- 1%-level (standard errors in parenthesis).
See table A4 in appendix 2 for the short-run coefficients. Based on results from 2nd estimation step.
This is especially interesting in the case of the size interaction (regression 6): If the
very small banks are excluded from the sample, a significant size effect can be found
even in the single-interaction regression. Obviously, the insignificance of the
coefficient of the size interaction in table 2a has been caused by those “very small”
banks – indicating that they do not behave in the way predicted by the 	


theory. As has already been pointed out, the reason is that these banks are mainly
credit cooperatives and savings banks (see tables 1 and 5) which use their short-term
interbank deposits to cushion the effects of monetary policy on their loan portfolio.
This is in line with the fact that these banks hold relatively large buffers of short-term
interbank deposits.
49 While the share of short-term interbank assets in total assets
amounts to an average of 10 % for the “very small” banks, it amounts to only 8 % for
all other banks. The motive for this higher share could well be that the “very small”
banks want to put themselves in a position to cushion possible shocks which would
otherwise force them to more strongly adapt their loan portfolio. This would be also in
line with the hypothesis that these “very small” banks maintain housebank
relationships with their loan customers (see above, section II).
50
                                                
49  See Deutsche Bundesbank (2001), esp. p. 57 and Upper, C./Worms, A. (2001).
50 The high share of short-term interbank deposits in total assets of the group of the “very large” and
“large” banks (see table 5) is probably not due to this motive, but rather to their more intensive overall
activity in interbank borrowing and lending. For a more detailled description, see Upper, C./Worms, A.
(2001).
0.1257 ** 0.0455 *** 0.3242 *** 0.0351 *** 0.0372 ***
(0.0524) (0.0054) (0.0263) (0.0124) (0.0064)
5.1608 *** 5.4195 *** 5.9016 *** 2.4208 3.0885 *
(1.3142) (1.7871) (1.8431) (2.6355) (1.6653)
-0.3521 *** -0.3679 *** -0.3483 *** -0.5487 *** -0.2441 ***
(0.0485) (0.0580) (0.0697) (0.1505) (0.0729)
AR1 (p-val,1st step) 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
AR2 (p-val,1st step) 0.307 0.444 0.349 0.651 0.523










regression 6 regression 7 regression 8 regression 9
[?]
  	 
[+]
[–]






















Coefficients and standard errors of the bank individual income and risk variable multiplied by 100.
*, **, *** = significance at the 10%-, 5%,- 1%-level (standard errors in parenthesis).
See table A5 in appendix 2 for the short-run coefficients. Based on results from 2nd estimation step.
The long-run coefficient of the interaction with the “other liquid assets” is now
significantly positive (regression 10). This is compatible with the idea that – while the
“very small” banks do not seem to use the “other liquid assets” to shield their loans to
private non-banks from restrictive monetary policy measures – the larger banks do so.
Given that the “other liquid assets” mainly consist of securities, this is compatible with
the idea that (opposite to the small banks) the larger banks sell securities to partly
shield their loan portfolios from restrictive monetary policy measures. But, this effect
is comparatively small: While the influence of short-term interbank deposits in the
single-interaction estimations is strong enough to completely dominate the size effect
in the case of the whole sample (regression 1), the influence of the liquidity variable(s)
is obviously too weak to completely offset the size effect in the case of the larger
banks (regression 6).
Moreover, the size of the coefficients of the - and of the !-interaction, as well as
of the interaction are comparatively similar. This and the fact that they all are
significant shows that splitting the liquidity variable into short-term interbank deposits
and  “other liquid assets” may not be appropriate in the case of the larger banks.
Indeed, repeating the double-interaction regressions with on the one side and
alternatively  and 	 on the other (like in table 3) yields unsatisfactory results (i.e.
	%"
	&"
0.0640 ** 0.2849 ***
(0.0263) (0.0282)
0.0370 *** 0.0360 ***
(0.0047) (0.0048)






AR1 (p-val,1st step) 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
AR2 (p-val,1st step) 0.602 0.970
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almost no significant interaction coefficients).
51 But, using liquidity instead of short-
term interbank deposits in all regressions basically confirms the results presented in
table 6 (see table 7):
52 The coefficients of the liquidity interaction are significantly
positive in both cases, and there is also a positive dependence of the banks´ reaction to
monetary policy on size and on capitalisation (the significantly positive coefficient of





A crucial condition for the existence of a 	

 that works through bank loans
is that monetary policy should be able to change the 
of bank loans. This paper
contributes to the discussion on this issue by presenting empirical evidence from
dynamic-panel estimations based on a dataset that comprises individual balance sheet
information on all German banks. It shows that the average bank´s response to
monetary policy mainly depends on its share of short-term interbank deposits in total
assets (and therefore on its liquidity): The higher this share, the less strongly does the
average bank reduce its loans in reaction to an interest rate increase. This is
compatible with the hypothesis that small banks – which are almost exclusively
organised in either the cooperative or the savings banks´ sector – draw on their short-
term interbank deposits to (at least partly) shield their loans to private non-banks from
restrictive monetary policy measures. The motive for such a behavior could be to
maintain close housebank-relationships to loan customers.
A significant dependence of a bank´s reaction to monetary policy on its size can only
be found if at the same time there is appropriate control for short-term interbank
deposits. Otherwise, a strong omitted variable bias results.
Reducing the sample to those largest banks that together cover 75 % of the loan
market (only about 10 % of all banks) – which excludes most of  the (small) savings
banks and credit cooperatives – reveals that the lack of a size effect in the basic
regressions was mainly due to the behavior of the small banks which hold a
comparatively large share of short-term interbank deposits on which they can draw.
Moreover, for the larger banks not only short-term interbank deposits but rather their
overall liquidity seems to determine their reaction to monetary policy.
                                                
51 See Worms, A. (2001).
52 The results of the double-interaction regressions based on the reduced sample have to be interpreted
more cautiously than those based on the complete sample: Relative to the number of coefficients to be
estimated, the sample consists of comparatively few banks only. Moreover, the long-run coefficients of the
control variables are insignificant in most cases.ECB • Working Paper No 96 • December 2001 30
These results are based on the 3-month interest rate as the monetary policy indicator.
Given the discussion in the literature of how to adequately measure monetary policy in
an empirical anlysis, the regressions have also been carried out on the basis of a VAR-
shock. In this robustness check, neither a positive dependence on size nor on
capitalisation could be found for the complete sample, independently of controlling for
short-term interbank deposits or not. Only the dependence on short-term interbank
deposits is robust against this change in the policy indicator.
Therefore, there is very robust evidence in favor of a differential reaction to monetary
policy across all banks that depends on short-term interbank deposits: Due to the fact
that (smaller) banks draw on their interbank deposits in reaction to a restrictive mone-
tary policy measure, small banks do not reduce loans more strongly than large ones.
Moreover, as soon as we control for the effect of short-term interbank deposits (or of
liquidity) and/or we exclude the very small banks from the sample, there is evidence
for a differential reaction to monetary policy across banks that depends on size.
The key assumption that must hold in order to interpret these results as evidence for
the existence of a 	

 is that these effects have to be attributable to a
differential reaction of the banks´ loan 
 to monetary policy. Put differently: The
differences in the loan response across banks should not be due to differences in loan
demand or to differences in loan supply that are not caused by monetary policy. Given
the results of this paper, this basically amounts to assuming that in reaction to a
monetary policy induced interest rate increase, the loan 	
 faced by small (and
less liquid) banks should not decrease more strongly than loan	
 faced by large
(and more liquid) banks.
Overall, the results in this paper are compatible with the existence of a 	


in Germany. This is a comparatively strong outcome if we take into account that the
regressions allow – by using the bank-individual income and risk variables, and by
explicitly considering bank-individual seasonal patterns – for many more differences
in the movements of loans across banks which are not attributable to monetary policy






 = bank  index
 =  period (quarter) index
 = sector  index
  = short-term market rate (3-month interest rate) .
W Q ' , = sum of total assets of bank 
.
W Q  , = volume of loans of bank 
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profit organisations
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Q￿W ( bank-specific risk-variable: weighted average of the number of
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Q￿W ( bank-specific income-variable: weighted average of the real output
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
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+  balances with the central bank
+ treasury bills, treasury certificates and similar debt
instruments issued by public bodies (eligible for
refinancing)
+ debt securities
+ shares and other variable-yield securities
+ asset items constituting claims on credit institutions with
an agreed maturity or redeemable at notice of one year or
less.
Q￿W  =  short-term interbank deposits of bank 
 as a percentage of total assets of bank

: short-term interbank deposits are:
asset items constituting claims on credit institutions with
an agreed maturity or redeemable at notice of one year
or less
!Q￿W = “other liquid assets” of bank 
 in percent of total assets of bank 
;
“other liquid assets” consist of:
cash
+  balances with the central bank
+ treasury bills, treasury certificates and similar debt
instruments issued by public bodies (eligible for
refinancing)
+ debt securities








Coefficients and standard errors of the bank individual income and risk variable multiplied by 100.
Standard errors in parenthesis (coefficients and standard deviations taken from 2
nd step results).
*** Significance on 1%-level, ** Significance on 5%-level , * Significance on 10%-level.
			'
variable: lag:
-0.0599 *** 0.0102 *** 0.0737 *** 0.0198 *** -0.0056 **
(0.0087) (0.0019) (0.0154) (0.0038) (0.0024)
-0.0072 0.0082 *** 0.0224 * 0.0281 *** -0.0027
(0.0046) (0.0014) (0.0118) (0.0036) (0.0019)
-0.0381 *** 0.0033 * 0.0434 ** 0.0245 *** -0.0100 ***
(0.0101) (0.0019) (0.0174) (0.0040) (0.0025)
0.0684 *** 0.0071 *** -0.0263 0.0066 0.0041 *
(0.0111) (0.0020) (0.0185) (0.0041) (0.0024)
0.1254 *** 0.1199 *** 0.1176 *** 0.1265 *** 0.1252 ***
(0.0064) (0.0051) (0.0053) (0.0056) (0.0062)
0.1112 *** 0.1175 *** 0.1115 *** 0.1189 *** 0.1106 ***
(0.0054) (0.0047) (0.0048) (0.0051) (0.0056)
0.0633 *** 0.0663 *** 0.0624 *** 0.0669 *** 0.0586 ***
(0.0045) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0046) (0.0049)
-0.1216 *** -0.1186 *** -0.1237 *** -0.1220 *** -0.1276 ***
(0.0041) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0042) (0.0044)
0.2346 0.0755 0.1547 0.2503 0.1806
(0.1634) (0.1690) (0.1683) (0.1743) (0.1809)
0.1090 0.0191 -0.0223 -0.0171 0.1658
(0.1625) (0.1649) (0.1683) (0.1713) (0.1779)
0.3626 ** 0.2497 0.2949 * 0.3254 ** 0.3391 **
(0.1560) (0.1525) (0.1540) (0.1535) (0.1688)
0.2739 * 0.2714 * 0.3717 ** 0.3557 ** 0.3554 **
(0.1536) (0.1520) (0.1533) (0.1573) (0.1684)
-0.2799 *** -0.2685 *** -0.2563 *** -0.3618 *** -0.3087 ***
(0.0357) (0.0359) (0.0359) (0.0445) (0.0415)
-0.1639 *** -0.1781 *** -0.1366 *** -0.1657 *** -0.1751 ***
(0.0317) (0.0319) (0.0327) (0.0352) (0.0362)
-0.0265 -0.0497 * -0.0026 -0.0890 *** -0.0594 *
(0.0272) (0.0290) (0.0290) (0.0304) (0.0344)
-0.0977 *** -0.1010 *** -0.0755 *** -0.1221 *** -0.1417 ***
(0.0228) (0.0236) (0.0234) (0.0250) (0.0281)
0.0069 0.0005 *** 0.0026 0.0003 *** -0.0001
(0.0084) (0.0001) (0.0020) (0.0001) (0.0001)
-0.0005 -0.0008 * -0.0006 0.0000 -0.0006
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
AR1 (p-val,1st step) 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
AR2 (p-val,1st step) 0.405 0.557 0.348 0.262 0.677
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Coefficients and standard errors of the bank individual income and risk variable multiplied by 100.
Standard errors in parenthesis (coefficients and standard deviations taken from 2
nd step results).
*** Significance on 1%-level, ** Significance on 5%-level , * Significance on 10%-level.
			'
variable: 	&"








0.0204 *** 0.0170 ***
(0.0033) (0.0038)
0.0313 *** 0.0224 ***
(0.0032) (0.0037)
0.0227 *** 0.0237 ***
(0.0037) (0.0040)
0.0113 *** 0.0026 ***
(0.0035) (0.0040)








0.1024 *** 0.1206 ***
(0.0060) (0.0058)
0.0955 *** 0.1119 ***
(0.0049) (0.0057)
0.0584 *** 0.0535 ***
(0.0041) (0.0056)








0.2565 * 0.3706 **
(0.1376) (0.1887)
-0.3403 *** -0.2686 ***
(0.0373) (0.0571)






-0.0487 *** -0.0051 **
(0.0084) (0.0023)






AR1 (p-val,1st step) 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
AR2 (p-val,1st step) 0.263 0.559
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Coefficients and standard errors of the bank individual income and risk variable multiplied by 100.
Standard errors in parenthesis (coefficients and standard deviations taken from 2
nd step results).











0.0052 *** 0.0054 ***
(0.0011) (0.0017)
0.0048 *** 0.0047 **
(0.0016) (0.0024)
0.0043 *** 0.0050 *
(0.0018) (0.0027)










0.0866 *** 0.1064 ***
(0.0061) (0.0225)
0.0938 *** 0.1033 ***
(0.0051) (0.0215)
0.0565 *** 0.0464 **
(0.0042) (0.0220)














-0.1032 *** 0.2584 *
(0.0259) (0.1429)










AR1 (p-val,1st step) 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
AR2 (p-val,1st step) 0.622 0.462



























































Coefficients and standard errors of the bank individual income and risk variable multiplied by 100.
Standard errors in parenthesis (coefficients and standard deviations taken from 2
nd step results).
*** Significance on 1%-level, ** Significance on 5%-level , * Significance on 10%-level.
			'
variable: 	"
-0.1491 *** 0.0213 *** 0.1826 *** 0.0138 *** 0.0158 ***
(0.0156) (0.0015) (0.0089) (0.0037) (0.0021)
0.0686 *** 0.0182 *** 0.0509 *** 0.0227 *** 0.0089 ***
(0.0095) (0.0012) (0.0061) (0.0032) (0.0015)
0.1009 *** -0.0049 *** -0.1332 *** -0.0081 ** -0.0017
(0.0177) (0.0015) (0.0096) (0.0035) (0.0017)
0.0824 *** -0.0019 0.1623 *** -0.0037 0.0060 ***
(0.0171) (0.0011) (0.0110) (0.0036) (0.0020)
0.1246 *** 0.0933 *** 0.1062 *** 0.1120 *** 0.0888 ***
(0.0163) (0.0153) (0.0115) (0.0235) (0.0195)
0.1034 *** 0.1249 *** 0.1130 *** 0.1318 *** 0.1282 ***
(0.0152) (0.0120) (0.0117) (0.0193) (0.0165)
0.0768 *** 0.1208 *** 0.0717 *** 0.1145 *** 0.0863 ***
(0.0139) (0.0126) (0.0107) (0.0197) (0.0142)
-0.1215 *** -0.0583 *** -0.1014 *** -0.0628 *** -0.0843 ***
(0.0134) (0.0113) (0.0095) (0.0182) (0.0148)
2.1565 *** 1.1949 *** 1.8844 *** 1.6383 ** 1.1712 ***
(0.2999) (0.3707) (0.4971) (0.6629) (0.4300)
1.4783 *** 1.2366 *** 1.5419 *** 0.7637 0.9348 **
(0.3406) (0.3882) (0.4742) (0.6240) (0.4269)
1.2957 *** 1.8665 *** 1.6252 *** 0.5960 1.0064 ***
(0.3023) (0.3786) (0.4496) (0.6386) (0.3625)
-0.7158 *** -0.3996 -0.2686 -1.2926 *** -0.7001 **
(0.2312) (0.2952) (0.2737) (0.4561) (0.2986)
-0.3046 *** -0.2133 *** -0.2822 *** -0.2772 *** -0.1963 ***
(0.0164) (0.0143) (0.0225) (0.0331) (0.0188)
-0.0985 *** -0.0764 *** -0.1014 *** -0.1232 *** -0.0589 ***
(0.0122) (0.0117) (0.0161) (0.0314) (0.0165)
0.0070 -0.0256 *** 0.0017 -0.0342 -0.0055
(0.0101) (0.0100) (0.0134) (0.0252) (0.0138)
0.1087 *** 0.0508 *** 0.0996 *** 0.0480 *** 0.0700 ***
(0.0073) (0.0063) (0.0097) (0.0173) (0.0101)
0.0012 0.0013 *** 0.0044 *** 0.0003 *** 0.0009 ***
(0.0064) (0.0001) (0.0011) (0.0001) (0.0001)
-0.0012 *** -0.0004 -0.0005 0.0007 -0.0003
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004)
AR1 (p-val,1st step) 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
AR2 (p-val,1st step) 0.307 0.444 0.349 0.651 0.523
Sargan (p-val, 2nd step) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
lags of IVs
no of observations
no of banks 247 273 247 221 251
5522
2-7 2-7 2-7
5434 6006 5434 4859
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Coefficients and standard errors of the bank individual income and risk variable multiplied by 100.
Standard errors in parenthesis (coefficients and standard deviations taken from 2
nd step results).
*** Significance on 1%-level, ** Significance on 5%-level , * Significance on 10%-level.
			'
variable: 	&"




0.0521 *** -0.0529 ***
(0.0102) (0.0074)
0.0743 *** 0.1796 ***
(0.0104) (0.0081)
0.0108 *** 0.0125 ***
(0.0016) (0.0013)
0.0142 *** 0.0161 ***
(0.0013) (0.0011)
0.0046 *** -0.0126 ***
(0.0018) (0.0016)
0.0002 ** 0.0069 ***
(0.0017) (0.0011)
0.0124 *** -0.0241 ***
(0.0008) (0.0011)
0.0105 *** 0.0026 ***
(0.0007) (0.0009)
-0.0058 *** -0.0095 ***
(0.0009) (0.0011)
0.0050 *** 0.0202 ***
(0.0009) (0.0011)
0.0564 *** 0.0967 ***
(0.0076) (0.0087)
0.1045 *** 0.1605 ***
(0.0067) (0.0073)
0.1064 *** 0.1343 ***
(0.0077) (0.0075)
















0.0853 *** 0.0350 *
(0.0188) (0.0197)
-0.0195 *** 0.0130 ***
(0.0041) (0.0008)
0.0020 *** 0.0011 ***
(0.0001) (0.0001)
-0.0001 *** 0.0003 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000)
-0.0015 *** -0.0017 ***
(0.0003) (0.0003)
AR1 (p-val,1st step) 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
AR2 (p-val,1st step) 0.602 0.970














































1 1− ⋅ 	  ∆
∆ ⋅ –1







	)  !""3$ The  	

 of







) !""$ Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo




4 !""3$: Financial Structure and the Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanism;
Bank for International Settlements - Monetary and Economic Department, C.B. 394,
March 1995.
4) 4  94	)    !"##$: Credit, Money, and Aggregate Demand; in:
'	
-!
!+, 78/2, May 1988, 435-439.
4) 4  9) ; !""3$: Inside the Black Box: The  	

 of





)!""3$: Measuring Monetary Policy; in: NBER Working
Paper No. 5145, June 1995.
4) 4  9;	
)  !""5$ What does the Bundesbank target?; in: NBER
Working Paper No. 5764, September 1996.
<	
)9:	)2=!""5$ Does Monetary Policy Have Differential Regional
Effects?; in: 0	 + 1	




<	)    !""3$ Distinguishing Theories of the Monetary Transmission
Mechanism; in: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, May/June 1995, 83 - 100.
<	)29);!""6$How The Bundesbank Conducts Monetary Policy; in:
Romer/ Romer (eds.): Reducing Inflation; University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
4
)>!"""$ Financial Structure and Monetary Transmission in Europe – A
Cross-Country Study; Doctoral Dissertation, Universiteit van Amsterdam.

),9,		):!+???$ The Monetary Transmission Mechanism: Evidence from
the Industry Data of Five OECD Countries; mimeo, Banca d´Italia.
4
!+??$Bank balance sheets, bank competition and monetary






















)<9	((	):!""#$ Immediate Challenges for the ECB:




),9;	(-A)>9 ) A9 
)  !+??$:
Financial systems and the role of banks in monetary policy transmission in the euro
area; in: European Central Bank Working Paper Series, forthcoming.ECB • Working Paper No 96 • December 2001 38
);9
)!+??$: Interbank lending and monetary policy transmission:
Evidence for Germany; European Central Bank Working Paper No. 73, July 2001.






/!, December 1998, 207-244.
:	),9;*)2<!+??$: The bank lending channel of monetary policy:
identification and estimation using Portuguese micro bank data; in: European Central




	),!"""$ The Transmission Mechanism of Mone-
tary Policy in Europe: Evidence from Bank´s Balance Sheets; in: NBER working paper
No. 7231.
)>9 







, August 1996, 288-298.
)9;
);!""6$: On the Existence of a 	

 of Monetary




),9B)B9A):9	(()!"""$ Will a common European
monetary policy have asymmetric effects? in: -!
!/, Federal Reserve




)4!"""$ Industry effects of monetary policy in Germany; in:
ZEI Working Paper No B14/1999, University of Bonn.
=

)=!+???$ Capital-market imperfections, investment, and the monetary
transmission mechanism; paper presented at the Bundesbank spring conference
„Investing Today for the World of Tomorrow“, 28/29 April 2000.
=D0	) E9	) A9
)  !+??$ Bank lending in the transmission of
monetary policy: A VECM analysis for Germany; in: International University in
Germany Working Paper 08/2001, Bruchsal.
B)>9 )>-!+??$ Monetary policy and bank lending – Evidence from
German banking groups; mimeo. De Nederlandsche Bank, January 2001.
B)B9 	)><!+???$What Do a Million Observations on Banks Say










/! 42 (June 1995), pp. 151-195.







18/3, August 1986, 290-303.








BD) ; !+???$: Banken in der geldpolitischen Transmission; Schriften zur
angewandten Wirtschaftsforschung 86, Mohr-Siebeck, Tuebingen.
;<) 4  !"""$ Analysis of the Monetary Transmission Mechanism:
Methodological Issues; CEPR/European Summer Institute Conference, Sept. 1999.ECB • Working Paper No 96 • December 2001  39
;D) ;9
)  !""3$: Targeting Monetary Aggregates, Interest Rate
Movements, and Credit Demand; in: Geld - Währung - Kapitalmarkt Working Papers
No. 38; University of Frankfurt/M., February 1995.




) !""3$ Bank Lending and the Transmission of Monetary
Policy; in: Peek/Rosengren (eds): Is Bank Lending Important for the Transmission of
Monetary Policy?; Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Conference Series No 39 (June
1995), 47-68.
20)29 
)!""#$ The Real Effects of Monetary Policy in the Euro-
pean Union: What are the differences? in: 520*	/	45/2, June 1998, 374-391.
2)&!""/$: How important is the 	

 in the transmission of mone-




















)B!""1$ Banking conditions and regional economic performance – Evi-













) 2 !"""$ The exchange rate and the monetary transmission
mechanism in Germany; in: 3-!
! 147 (4), pp. 489-521.
 GH)!""5$ Enterprises´ financial structure and their response to monetary policy
stimuli – An analysis based on the Deutsche Bundesbank´s corporate balance sheet
statistics, Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Papier No. 9.

	) < !""3$ Is there a credit channel in the transmission of monetary
policy? Evidence from four countries; in: BIS(ed): Financial Structure and the
Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanism, Basle, pp. 154-187.









)!+??$: Estimating bilateral exposures in the German interbank
market: is there a danger of contagion?; in BIS (ed.): Marrying the macro- and micro-
prudential dimensions of financial stability, BIS papers No 1, pp.211-229.

)!""#$Bankkredite an Unternehmen und ihre Rolle in der geldpolitischen
Transmission in Deutschland; Peter Lang-Verlag, Reihe Europäische Hochschul-
schriften, Reihe V: Volks- und Betriebswirtschaft, No. 2244.

)  !+??$ Monetary policy effects on bank loans in Germany: A panel-
econometric analysis; Economic Research Centre of the Deutsche Bundesbank
Discussion Paper, forthcoming.European Central Bank Working Paper Series 
 
 
  1  “A global hazard index for the world foreign exchange markets” by V. Brousseau and  
F. Scacciavillani, May 1999. 
 
  2  “What does the single monetary policy do? A SVAR benchmark for the European Central 
Bank” by C. Monticelli and O. Tristani, May 1999. 
 
  3  “Fiscal policy effectiveness and neutrality results in a non-Ricardian world” by C. Detken, 
May 1999. 
 
  4  “From the ERM to the euro: new evidence on economic and policy convergence among  
EU countries” by I. Angeloni and L. Dedola, May 1999. 
 
  5  “Core inflation: a review of some conceptual issues” by M. Wynne, May 1999. 
 
  6  “The demand for M3 in the euro area” by G. Coenen and J.-L. Vega, September 1999. 
 
  7  “A cross-country comparison of market structures in European banking” by O. de Bandt  
and E. P. Davis, September 1999. 
 
  8  “Inflation zone targeting” by A. Orphanides and V. Wieland, October 1999. 
 
  9  “Asymptotic confidence bands for the estimated autocovariance and autocorrelation 
functions of vector autoregressive models” by G. Coenen, January 2000. 
 
10  “On the effectiveness of sterilized foreign exchange intervention” by R. Fatum,  
February 2000. 
 
11  “Is the yield curve a useful information variable for the Eurosystem?” by J. M. Berk and  
P. van Bergeijk, February 2000. 
 
12  “Indicator variables for optimal policy” by L. E. O. Svensson and M. Woodford,  
February 2000. 
 
13  “Monetary policy with uncertain parameters” by U. Söderström, February 2000. 
 
14  “Assessing nominal income rules for monetary policy with model and data uncertainty”  
by G. D. Rudebusch, February 2000. 
 
15  “The quest for prosperity without inflation” by A. Orphanides, March 2000. 
 
16  “Estimating the implied distribution of the future short term interest rate using the Longstaff-
Schwartz model” by P. Hördahl, March 2000. 
  
17  “Alternative measures of the NAIRU in the euro area: estimates and assessment”  
by S. Fabiani and R. Mestre, March 2000. 
 
18  “House prices and the macroeconomy in Europe: Results from a structural VAR analysis”  
by M. Iacoviello, April 2000. 
ECB • Working Paper No 96 • December 2001 4019  “The euro and international capital markets” by C. Detken and P. Hartmann,  
April 2000. 
 
20  “Convergence of fiscal policies in the euro area” by O. De Bandt and F. P. Mongelli,  
May 2000. 
 
21  “Firm size and monetary policy transmission: evidence from German business survey data”  
by M. Ehrmann, May 2000. 
 
22  “Regulating access to international large value payment systems” by C. Holthausen 
and T. Rønde, June 2000. 
 
23   “Escaping Nash inflation” by In-Koo Cho and T. J. Sargent, June 2000. 
 
24  “What horizon for price stability” by F. Smets, July 2000. 
 
25  “Caution and conservatism in the making of monetary policy” by P. Schellekens, July 2000. 
 
26  “Which kind of transparency? On the need for clarity in monetary policy-making”  
by B. Winkler, August 2000. 
 
27  “This is what the US leading indicators lead” by M. Camacho and G. Perez-Quiros,  
August 2000. 
 
28  “Learning, uncertainty and central bank activism in an economy with strategic interactions” 
by M. Ellison and N. Valla, August 2000. 
 
29  “The sources of unemployment fluctuations: an empirical application to the Italian case” by  
S. Fabiani, A. Locarno, G. Oneto and P. Sestito, September 2000. 
 
30  “A small estimated euro area model with rational expectations and nominal rigidities”  
by G. Coenen and V.  Wieland, September 2000. 
 
31  “The disappearing tax base: Is foreign direct investment eroding corporate income taxes?”  
by R. Gropp and K. Kostial, September 2000. 
 
32  “Can indeterminacy explain the short-run non-neutrality of money?” by F. De Fiore, 
September 2000. 
 
33  “The information content of M3 for future inflation” by C. Trecroci and J. L. Vega,  
October 2000. 
 
34  “Capital market development, corporate governance and the credibility of exchange rate 
pegs” by O. Castrén and T. Takalo, October 2000. 
 
35  “Systemic risk: A survey” by O. De Bandt and P. Hartmann, November 2000. 
 
36  “Measuring core inflation in the euro area” by C. Morana, November 2000. 
 
37  “Business fixed investment: Evidence of a financial accelerator in Europe” by P. Vermeulen, 
November 2000. 
ECB • Working Paper No 96 • December 2001  4138  “The optimal inflation tax when taxes are costly to collect” by F. De Fiore, November 2000. 
 
39  “A money demand system for euro area M3” by C. Brand and N. Cassola, November 2000. 
 
40  “Financial structure and the interest rate channel of ECB monetary policy” by B. Mojon, 
November 2000. 
 
41  “Why adopt transparency? The publication of central bank forecasts” by P. M. Geraats, 
January 2001. 
 
42  “An area-wide model (AWM) for the euro area” by G. Fagan, J. Henry and R. Mestre,  
January 2001. 
 
43  “Sources of economic renewal: from the traditional firm to the knowledge firm”  
by D. R. Palenzuela, February 2001. 
 
44  “The supply and demand for eurosystem deposits – The first 18 months” by U. Bindseil and 
F. Seitz, February 2001. 
 
45  “Testing the Rank of the Hankel matrix: a statistical approach” by G. Camba-Mendez and  
G. Kapetanios, February 2001.  
 
46  “A two-factor model of the German term structure of interest rates” by N. Cassola and  
J. B. Luís, February 2001. 
 
47  “Deposit insurance and moral hazard: does the counterfactual matter?” by R. Gropp and  
J. Vesala, February 2001. 
 
48  “Financial market integration in Europe: on the effects of EMU on stock markets” by  
M. Fratzscher, March 2001. 
 
49  “Business cycle and monetary policy analysis in a structural sticky-price model of the euro 
area” by M. Casares, March 2001. 
 
50  “Employment and productivity growth in service and manufacturing sectors in France, 
Germany and the US” by T. von Wachter, March 2001. 
 
51  “The functional form of the demand for euro area M1” by L. Stracca, March 2001. 
 
52  “Are the effects of monetary policy in the euro area greater in recessions than in booms?” by 
G. Peersman and F. Smets, March 2001. 
 
53  “An evaluation of some measures of core inflation for the euro area” by J.-L. Vega and  
M. A. Wynne, April 2001. 
 
54  “Assessment criteria for output gap estimates” by G. Camba-Méndez and D. R. Palenzuela, 
April 2001. 
 
55  “Modelling the demand for loans to the private sector in the euro area” by A. Calza,  
G. Gartner and J. Sousa, April 2001. 
 
ECB • Working Paper No 96 • December 2001 42 56  “Stabilization policy in a two country model and the role of financial frictions” by E. Faia, 
April 2001. 
 
57  “Model-based indicators of labour market rigidity” by S. Fabiani and D. Rodriguez-Palenzuela, 
April 2001. 
 
58  “Business cycle asymmetries in stock returns: evidence from higher order moments and 
conditional densities” by G. Perez-Quiros and A. Timmermann, April 2001. 
 
59  “Uncertain potential output: implications for monetary policy” by M. Ehrmann and F. Smets, 
April 2001. 
 
60  “A multi-country trend indicator for euro area inflation: computation and properties” by  
E. Angelini, J. Henry and R. Mestre, April 2001. 
 
61  “Diffusion index-based inflation forecasts for the euro area” by  E. Angelini, J. Henry and  
R. Mestre, April 2001. 
 
62  “Spectral based methods to identify common trends and common cycles” by G. C. Mendez 
and G. Kapetanios, April 2001. 
 
63  “Does money lead inflation in the euro area?” by S. N. Altimari, May 2001. 
 
64  “Exchange rate volatility and euro area imports” by R. Anderton and F. Skudelny, May 2001. 
 
65  “A system approach for measuring the euro area NAIRU” by S. Fabiani and R. Mestre,  
May 2001. 
 
66  “Can short-term foreign exchange volatility be predicted by the Global Hazard Index?” by  
V. Brousseau and F. Scacciavillani, June 2001. 
 
67  “The daily market for funds in Europe: Has something changed with the EMU?” by  
G. P. Quiros and H. R. Mendizabal, June 2001. 
 
68  “The performance of forecast-based monetary policy rules under model uncertainty” by 
A. Levin, V. Wieland and J. C.Williams, July 2001. 
 
69  “The ECB monetary policy strategy and the money market” by V. Gaspar, G. Perez-Quiros 
and J. Sicilia, July 2001. 
 
70  “Central Bank forecasts of liquidity factors: Quality, publication and the control of the 
overnight rate” by U. Bindseil, July 2001. 
 
71  “Asset market linkages in crisis periods” by P. Hartmann, S. Straetmans and C. G. de Vries, 
July 2001.  
 
72  “Bank concentration and retail interest rates” by S. Corvoisier and R. Gropp, July 2001. 
 
73  “Interbank lending and monetary policy transmission – evidence for Germany” by 
M. Ehrmann and A. Worms, July 2001. 
 
ECB • Working Paper No 96 • December 2001  4374  “Interbank market integration under asymmetric information” by X. Freixas and 
C. Holthausen, August 2001. 
 
75   “Value at risk models in finance” by S. Manganelli and R. F. Engle, August 2001. 
 
76   “Rating agency actions and the pricing of debt and equity of European banks: What can we  
  infer about private sector monitoring of bank soundness?” by R. Gropp and A. J. Richards,  
 August  2001. 
 
77   “Cyclically adjusted budget balances: An alternative approach” by C. Bouthevillain, P. Cour-
Thimann, G. van den Dool, P. Hernández de Cos, G. Langenus, M. Mohr, S. Momigliano and 
M. Tujula, September 2001. 
 
78   “Investment and monetary policy in the euro area” by B. Mojon, F. Smets and P. Vermeulen, 
September 2001. 
 
79   “Does liquidity matter? Properties of a synthetic divisia monetary aggregate in the euro area” 
by L. Stracca, October 2001. 
 
80   “The microstructure of the euro money market” by P. Hartmann, M. Manna and 
A. Manzanares, October 2001. 
 
81   “What can changes in structural factors tell us about unemployment in Europe?” by J. Morgan 
and A. Mourougane, October 2001. 
 
82   “Economic forecasting: some lessons from recent research” by D. Hendry and M. Clements, 
October 2001. 
 
83   “Chi-squared tests of interval and density forecasts, and the Bank of England's fan charts” by 
K. F. Wallis, November 2001. 
 
84   “Data uncertainty and the role of money as an information variable for monetary policy” by 
G. Coenen, A. Levin and V. Wieland, November 2001. 
 
85   “Determinants of the euro real effective exchange rate: a BEER/PEER approach” by F. Maeso-
Fernandez, C. Osbat and B. Schnatz, November 2001. 
 
86   “Rational expectations and near rational alternatives: how best to form expecations” by 
M. Beeby, S. G. Hall and S. B. Henry, November 2001. 
 
87   “Credit rationing, output gap and business cycles” by F. Boissay, November 2001. 
 
88  “Why is it so difficult to beat the random walk forecast of exchange rates?” by L. Kilian and 
M. P. Taylor, November 2001. 
 
89  “Monetary policy and fears of instability” by V. Brousseau and Carsten Detken, November 
2001.  
 
90  “Public pensions and growth” by S. Lambrecht, P. Michel and J. -P. Vidal, November 2001.  
 
ECB • Working Paper No 96 • December 2001 44ECB • Working Paper No 96 • December 2001  45
91 “The monetary transmission mechanism in the euro area: more evidence from VAR
analysis“ by G. Peersman and F. Smets, December 2001.
92 “A VAR description of the effects of the monetary policy in the individual countries of the
euro area” by B. Mojon and G. Peersman, December 2001.
93 “The monetary transmission mechanism at the euro-area level: issues and results using
structural macroeconomic models” by P. McAdam and J. Morgan, December 2001.
94 “Monetary policy transmission in the euro area: What do aggregate and national
structural models tell us?” by P. van Els, A. Locarno, J. Morgan and J.-P. Villetelle,
December 2001.
95 “Some stylised facts on the euro area business cycle” by A.-M. Agresti and B. Mojon,
December 2001.
96 “The reaction of bank lending to monetary policy measures in Germany” by A.Worms,
December 2001.
97 “Asymmetries in bank lending behaviour.  Austria during the 1990s.” by S. Kaufmann,
December 2001.
98 “The credit channel in the Netherlands: evidence from bank balance sheets”
by L. De Haan, December 2001.
99 “Is there a bank lending channel of monetary policy in Spain?” by I. Hernando
and J. Martínez-Pages, December 2001.
100 “Transmission of monetary policy shocks in Finland: evidence from bank level data on
loans” by J. Topi and J. Vilmunen, December 2001.
101 “Monetary policy and bank lending in France: are there asymmetries?” by C. Loupias,
F. Savignac and P. Sevestre, December 2001.
102 “The bank lending channel of monetary policy: identification and estimation using
Portuguese micro bank data” by L. Farinha and C. Robalo Marques, December 2001.
103 “Bank-specific characteristics and monetary policy transmission: the case of Italy”
by L. Gambacorta, December 2001.
104 “Is there a bank lending channel of monetary policy in Greece? Evidence from bank level
data” by S. N. Brissimis, N. C. Kamberoglou and G. T. Simigiannis, December 2001.
105 “Financial systems and the role of banks in monetary policy transmission in the euro
area” by M. Ehrmann, L. Gambacorta, J. Martínez-Pages, P. Sevestre, A. Worms,
December 2001.
106 “Investment, the cost of capital, and monetary policy in the nineties in France: a panel
data investigation” by J. B. Chatelain and A. Tiomo, December 2001.
107 “The interest rate and credit channel in Belgium: an investigation with micro-level firm
data” by P. Butzen, C. Fuss and P. Vermeulen, December 2001.ECB • Working Paper No 96 • December 2001 46
108 “Credit channel and investment behaviour in Austria: a micro-econometric approach”
by M. Valderrama, December 2001.
109 “Monetary transmission in Germany: new perspectives on financial constraints and
investment spending” by U. von Kalckreuth, December 2001.
110 “Does monetary policy have asymmetric effects? A look at the investment decisions of
Italian firms” by E. Gaiotti and A. Generale, December 2001.
111 “Monetary transmission: empirical evidence from Luxembourg firm level data”
by P. Lünnemann and T. Mathä, December 2001.
112 “Firm investment and monetary transmission in the euro area” by J. B. Chatelain,
A. Generale, I. Hernando, U. von Kalckreuth and P.  Vermeulen, December 2001.